Skills/PyPI/iflow-mcp-firstbatchxyz-mem-agent-mcp

iflow-mcp-firstbatchxyz-mem-agent-mcp@0.1.0

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Top-level workspace aggregating agent and mcp_server" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · joined 9 days agoInstalls 21Last detonated 12 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-03 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompt injection; Prompt injection; Authorization escalation language. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.3sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.3sprocessexec .venv/bin/mem-agent-mcp
0.3sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/mem-agent-mcp': No such file or directory
0.3sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

CRITICAL
Prompt injectionREADME.md:410 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionREADME.md:418 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:410 · Authorization escalation languageFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedagent/engine.py:128 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:418 · Authorization escalation languageFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedagent/engine.py:287 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_server/scripts/memory_setup.py:85 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressmcp_server/mcp_http_server.py:292 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedagent/engine.py:238 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressmcp_server/mcp_http_server.py:292 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Tunneling service URLmcp_server/mcp_sse_server.py:310 · Tunneling service URL — may route traffic to attacker infrastructureFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07

What would make this Verified

7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim pypi: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Does not do what the description says≈ +5 on the totalIn the sandbox the skill never performed the task it claims (no call to the service it is for). Make sure the happy path runs without extra setup, or describe the real behavior.
  3. Outbound HTTP to raw IP address≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  4. Tunneling service URL≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  5. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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