Skills/PyPI/iflow-mcp-codebadger

iflow-mcp-codebadger@0.3.2

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "A containerized Model Context Protocol (MCP) server providing static code analysis using Joern's Code Property Graph (CPG) technology" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher lekssays-lekssays · joined 1 days agoInstalls 14Last detonated 21 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-02 and scored it 55/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent; HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent; HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_validators.py:258 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_validators.py:326 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentsrc/iflow_mcp_codebadger.egg-info/PKG-INFO:223 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_validators.py:319 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/services/cpg_generator.py:187 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_validators.py:208 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_validators.py:208 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/services/joern_server_manager.py:224 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentPKG-INFO:223 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentREADME.md:202 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/services/cpg_generator.py:223 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

What would make this Verified

25 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim lekssays-lekssays: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim lekssays-lekssays