Skills/PyPI/hydracept

hydracept@0.5.4

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Python client and CLI for the Hydracept public API — execution control plane for software and agents." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server) · listed in the official MCP RegistryPublisher zencodeinc · publishing for 96 daysInstalls 4,576Last detonated 5d ago
$claude mcp add hydracept -- uvx hydracept
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
HYDRACEPT_API_KEYHYDRACEPT_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: COMPUTERNAME, HYDRACEPT_API_URL, HYDRACEPT_ENVIRONMENT, HYDRACEPT_PROJECT, HYDRACEPT_PROJECT_ID, HYDRACEPT_PROJECT_NAME, PYTEST_CURRENT_TEST, USERNAME
Where it talks to
hydracept.com (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for HYDRACEPT_API_KEY, HYDRACEPT_TOKEN and talks to hydracept.com. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets HYDRACEPT_API_KEY=hydracept.com,HYDRACEPT_TOKEN=hydracept.com -- uvx hydracept

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionhydracept/cli/main.py:1162 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesoutput: Path = typer.Option(Path(".hydracept/agent-context.json"), "--output"),Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathshydracept/cli/bootstrap.py:119 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".hydracept/*.env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_doctor_cli.py:115 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_smoke_runner.py:29 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsb"\x00\x00\x00\x1f\x15\xc4\x89"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_version.py:85 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_smoke_runner.py:28 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsb"\x00\x00\x00\rIHDR\x00\x00\x00\x01\x00\x00\x00\x01\x08\x06"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathshydracept/cli/bootstrap.py:120 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env.hydracept",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_version.py:31 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_smoke_runner.py:30 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsb"\x00\x00\x00\nIDATx\x9cc\xf8\xcf\xc0\x00\x00\x03\x01\x01\x00"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_dotenv.py:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv = tmp_path / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_version.py:48 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈60 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for hydracept@0.5.4 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.