Skills/PyPI/ht32-wiki-mcp

ht32-wiki-mcp@0.9.2

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "HT32 Wiki MCP Server - 为 AI Agent 提供 HT32 MCU 选型与知识检索" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 729 daysInstalls 5,027Last detonated 32 min ago
$claude mcp add ht32-wiki-mcp -- uvx ht32-wiki-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
EMBED_API_KEYRERANK_API_KEYSILICONFLOW_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: CACHE_DIR, DS_RAG_AUTOBUILD, DS_RAG_RERANK, DS_RAG_VECTOR, EMBED_BATCH, EMBED_BATCH_INTERVAL, EMBED_DIM, EMBED_MAX_RETRY, EMBED_MODEL, EMBED_RETRY_BASE, EMBED_TIMEOUT, EMBED_URL, FEEDBACK_ROOT, MCP_HOST, MCP_JSON_RESPONSE, MCP_PATH, MCP_PORT, MCP_STATELESS_HTTP, MCP_TRANSPORT, MCP_WARMUP, QUERY_VEC_CACHE_MAX, RAW_BASE_URL, RERANK_MODEL, RERANK_TIMEOUT, RERANK_URL, WIKI_LEX_BM25, WIKI_RELEVANCE_GATE, WIKI_RERANK_FLOOR, WIKI_RERANK_SKIP, WIKI_ROOT, WIKI_RRF, WIKI_RRF_LEX_WEIGHT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso example.test, siliconflow.cn, s621.work — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names example.test, siliconflow.cn, s621.work as well as its own vendor. The guard injects EMBED_API_KEY, RERANK_API_KEY, SILICONFLOW_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx ht32-wiki-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.8.1

vet-skills diff ht32-wiki-mcp 0.8.1 0.9.2

This version reaches for something 0.8.1 did not: 2 new hosts (example.test, s621.work). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New hosts
example.test, s621.work

0.8.1 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest_rawfiles.py:85 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files("穿越 ..", "raw/../../.env", 400),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest_rawfiles.py:87 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files("绝对路径", "/etc/passwd", 400),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest_rawfiles.py:86 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files("反斜杠穿越", "raw\\..\\..\\.env", 400),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths_calib_relevance.py:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files需要 .work/mcp-server/.venv 且配好 EMBED_API_KEY / RERANK_API_KEY(读 ht32-wiki/.env)。Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsmoke_stdio.py:93 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssmoke_stdio.py:450 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files{"name": "get_wiki_page", "arguments": {"path": "../../etc/passwd"}},Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssmoke_stdio.py:469 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files{"name": "get_raw_file", "arguments": {"path": "raw/../../.env"}},Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsmoke_stdio.py:127 · Python subprocess execution detectedself._proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file paths_calib_relevance.py:23 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfor line in (WIKI / ".env").read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines():Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest_rawfiles.py:210 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filestrav = await client.get("/ht32-wiki/raw/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/.env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest_search.py:314 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_, _, err2 = loader.get_page_by_path("a/b.md/../../../../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest_search.py:313 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_, _, err = loader.get_page_by_path("../../.env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈50 tok
1 file · 46 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.