Skills/PyPI/ht32-code-mcp

ht32-code-mcp@0.5.7

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "HT32 Code MCP Server - 为 AI Agent 提供 HT32 函数库/例程/模板检索与工程导出" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher pypi · publishing for 726 daysInstalls 2,061Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add ht32-code-mcp -- uvx ht32-code-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso holtek.com.tw — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx ht32-code-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.4.4

vet-skills diff ht32-code-mcp 0.4.4 0.5.7

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.4.4 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

0.4.4 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_component_export.py:38 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert not (out / "components/ht32_bsp/.env").exists()Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_component_export.py:55 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert {e["path"] for e in row["excluded"]} >= {".env", ".gitignore", "docs/guide.md"}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/conftest.py:61 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files内容刻意包含:普通源码、文档、带空格路径、二进制、`.env` 与 `.gitignore`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_component_source.py:109 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert {e["path"] for e in snap.excluded} >= {".env", ".gitignore"}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/ht32_code_mcp/component_source.py:41 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesr"(^|/)\.env$",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsmoke_http.py:148 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/test_components.py:275 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringassert catalog.remote_url("r") == "http://100.66.1.6:3000/a/b.git"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_component_tools.py:196 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfor path in ("../secret.txt", "/etc/passwd", "C:/Windows/win.ini",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/ht32_code_mcp/component_source.py:43 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesr"(^|/)\.netrc$",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_component_source.py:108 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert ".env" not in names and ".gitignore" not in namesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/ht32_code_mcp/component_source.py:42 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesr"(^|/)\.env\..*",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/ht32_code_mcp/component_source.py:190 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/test_components.py:259 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filtering"r": { "url": "http://100.66.1.6:3000/a/b.git" } // URL 里的 // 不能被吃掉Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/ht32_code_mcp/components.py:451 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/conftest.py:82 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileswrite(repo, ".env", "TOKEN=secret-value-should-not-export\n")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_component_source.py:213 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(".env", True), (".gitignore", True), ("id_rsa", True), ("certs/server.pem", True),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_component_source.py:170 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileszf.writestr(info, "../../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_component_export.py:142 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert not any(n.endswith(".env") for n in names)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_component_source.py:214 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files("src/main.c", False), ("docs/.env.example", True),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/conftest.py:37 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), *args], capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/test_components.py:259 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot name"r": { "url": "http://100.66.1.6:3000/a/b.git" } // URL 里的 // 不能被吃掉Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
LOW
Dynamic module loadingtests/test_eval_corpus.py:24 · Dynamic module loading (importlib.loader.exec_module via provenance)spec.loader.exec_module(mod)Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
LOW
Dynamic module loadingtests/test_eval_corpus.py:23 · Dynamic module loadingmod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/test_components.py:275 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot nameassert catalog.remote_url("r") == "http://100.66.1.6:3000/a/b.git"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈51 tok
1 file · 38 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for ht32-code-mcp@0.5.7 as of 13 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.