Skills/PyPI/guardmcp

guardmcp@0.1.0

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Security scanner for MCP server configurations. Detects secrets, injection, auth issues, and maps to OWASP MCP Top 10." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher loplop-h · joined 2 days agoInstalls 11Last detonated 2d ago
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Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-01 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.3sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.3sprocessexec .venv/bin/mcpguard
0.3sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/mcpguard': No such file or directory
0.3sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellsrc/mcpguard/engine.py:286 · Remote installer piped to shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
GitHub token pattern detectedtests/conftest.py:30 · GitHub token pattern detected — possible hardcoded or harvested tokenFix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_fixer.py:89 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
GitHub token pattern detectedtests/test_fixer.py:156 · GitHub token pattern detected — possible hardcoded or harvested tokenFix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
MEDIUM
GitHub token pattern detectedtests/test_engine.py:42 · GitHub token pattern detected — possible hardcoded or harvested tokenFix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/mcpguard/inspector.py:129 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcpguard/inspector.py:140 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
GitHub token pattern detectedtests/test_fixer.py:43 · GitHub token pattern detected — possible hardcoded or harvested tokenFix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
MEDIUM
GitHub token pattern detectedtests/test_fixer.py:143 · GitHub token pattern detected — possible hardcoded or harvested tokenFix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
MEDIUM
References a credential file in the home directorytests/test_inspector.py:26 · References a credential file in the home directoryFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Reads credential paths from the home directorytests/test_inspector.py:26 · Reads credential paths from the home directoryFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_inspector.py:26 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_inspector.py:67 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_inspector.py:174 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_inspector.py:67 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

What would make this Verified

9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim loplop-h: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Does not do what the description says≈ +5 on the totalIn the sandbox the skill never performed the task it claims (no call to the service it is for). Make sure the happy path runs without extra setup, or describe the real behavior.
  3. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. GitHub token pattern detected≈ +2 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
  5. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
  6. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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