Skills/PyPI/gitlab-ci-mcp

gitlab-ci-mcp@0.5.4

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "MCP server for self-hosted GitLab — pipelines, schedules, branches, merge requests and repository files" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher mshegolev · joined 7 days agoInstalls 172Last detonated 2d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-01 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent; Credential pass-through configuration. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.2sprocessexec .venv/bin/gitlab-ci-mcp
0.2sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/gitlab-ci-mcp': No such file or directory
0.2sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_entrypoint.py:86 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentevaluations/questions.xml:2 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST01
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/gitlab_ci_mcp/ci_manager.py:64 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02

What would make this Verified

6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mshegolev: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Does not do what the description says≈ +5 on the totalIn the sandbox the skill never performed the task it claims (no call to the service it is for). Make sure the happy path runs without extra setup, or describe the real behavior.
  4. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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