Skills/PyPI/gevety-mcp

gevety-mcp@0.12.0

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "MCP Server for Gevety Health - Claude Desktop integration for blood test tracking" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher gevety · joined 2 days agoInstalls 138Last detonated 2d ago

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-01 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Destructive file system command detected; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.4sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.5sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.5sprocessexec .venv/bin/gevety-mcp
0.5sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/gevety-mcp': No such file or directory
0.5sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/setup-ai-assistant.sh:7 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedscripts/setup-ai-assistant.sh:91 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/setup-ai-assistant.sh:7 · Remote installer piped to shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLscripts/setup-ai-assistant.sh:7 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourceFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

What would make this Verified

5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim gevety: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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