Skills/PyPI/genealogy-mcp

genealogy-mcp@0.7.0

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Genealogy research toolkit for AI assistants (MCP server): 171 archives and databases (Russia and the former USSR, Europe, Latin America, US), where a province's records are kept today, live search, name variants and Daitch–Mokotoff, Julian/Hebrew/Republican calendars, church feasts, kinship and DNA, evidence checks, a research project that remembers, your own GEDCOM tree read and changed in place without losing anything, GEDCOM import/export." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher igormel81 · joined 3 days agoInstalls 0Last detonated 3d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-10-31 and scored it 67/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Hidden zero-width characters detected; Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction files; Hidden zero-width characters detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.2sprocessexec .venv/bin/genealogy-mcp
0.2sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/genealogy-mcp': No such file or directory
0.2sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/test_gedfile.py:65 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedsrc/genealogy_mcp/gedfile.py:465 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/genealogy_mcp/project.py:173 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filessrc/genealogy_mcp/data/docs/research-prompts.md:60 · Instructs the agent to modify its persistent memory or instruction filesFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Dense URL-encoded contenttests/test_online.py:10 · Dense URL-encoded content — may be obfuscating payloadsFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/genealogy_mcp/project.py:159 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_project.py:58 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_site.py:63 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedsrc/genealogy_mcp/audit.py:41 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionsrc/genealogy_mcp/data/docs/books-and-event-evidence.md:42 · Prompt injection — explicit attempt to bypass safety measuresFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedsrc/genealogy_mcp/gedfile.py:190 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_site.py:29 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

What would make this Verified

13 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Text that tells the agent to ignore its instructions≈ +9 on the totalDelete phrases like "ignore previous instructions", "override", "bypass" from SKILL.md and tool descriptions. Describe what the skill does; do not instruct the agent about other rules.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim igormel81: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Does not do what the description says≈ +5 on the totalIn the sandbox the skill never performed the task it claims (no call to the service it is for). Make sure the happy path runs without extra setup, or describe the real behavior.
  4. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +2 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Dense URL-encoded content≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
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