Skills/PyPI/gemini-pro-mcp

gemini-pro-mcp@0.1.4

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server that brings your Google AI Pro subscription (Gemini via Antigravity CLI, Flow) and the Gemini API (Omni video, Nano Banana images) to Claude and other MCP clients." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher muzaqil555 · publishing for 6 daysInstalls 0Last detonated 5d ago
$claude mcp add gemini-pro-mcp -- uvx gemini-pro-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
GEMINI_API_KEYGOOGLE_API_KEYJULES_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: AGY_PATH, CODEX_HOME, GEMINI_PRO_AGY_MODEL, GEMINI_PRO_AGY_TIMEOUT, GEMINI_PRO_CHROME, GEMINI_PRO_ENV_FILE, GEMINI_PRO_FLOW_PORT, GEMINI_PRO_FLOW_PROFILE, GEMINI_PRO_FLOW_PROJECT, GEMINI_PRO_OUTPUT_DIR
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso google.com, antigravity.google, flowmusic.app, playground.google — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names google.com, antigravity.google, flowmusic.app, playground.google as well as its own vendor. The guard injects GEMINI_API_KEY, GOOGLE_API_KEY, JULES_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx gemini-pro-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/gemini_pro_mcp/config.py:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesDEFAULT_ENV_FILE = Path.home() / ".config" / "gemini-pro-mcp" / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_stitch.py:11 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/gemini_pro_mcp/config.py:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files~/.config/gemini-pro-mcp/.env (or point GEMINI_PRO_ENV_FILE at another file).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/gemini_pro_mcp/config.py:1 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Settings, read from environment variables and an optional .env file.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_server.py:125 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv = tmp_path / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectiondocs/README.az.md:52 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file…, `image_generate`) üçün [Google AI Studio](https://aistudio.google.com/apikey)-dan API açarı lazımdır. Onu `~/.config/gemini-pro-mcp/.env` faylına `GEMINI_API_KEY…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/gemini_pro_mcp/install.py:254 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesblock += ["", f"[mcp_servers.{value(name)}.env]"]Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Prompt injectiondocs/README.tr.md:52 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file…, `image_generate`) için [Google AI Studio](https://aistudio.google.com/apikey)'dan bir API anahtarı gerekir. Onu `~/.config/gemini-pro-mcp/.env` dosyasına `GEMINI…Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/gemini_pro_mcp/flow/browser.py:99 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/gemini_pro_mcp/install.py:274 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/gemini_pro_mcp/install.py:53 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈81 tok
1 file · 51 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for gemini-pro-mcp@0.1.4 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.