fuzzmind-frida-mcp@0.1.0
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "Frida MCP server for authorized dynamic analysis and application security research" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-10-31 and scored it 60/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Prompt injection; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationst+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.4sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.4sprocessexec .venv/bin/fuzzmind-frida-mcp
0.4sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/fuzzmind-frida-mcp': No such file or directory
0.4sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
Static findings
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/fuzzmind_frida_mcp/tools/recipes/workflow.py:727 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05CRITICAL
Prompt injectionREADME.md:422 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/fuzzmind_frida_mcp/tools/_core.py:69 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/fuzzmind_frida_mcp/tools/recipes/workflow.py:371 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/fuzzmind_frida_mcp/tools/lifecycle/script.py:587 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/fuzzmind_frida_mcp/tools/lifecycle/script.py:849 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_android_emulator_integration.py:70 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_android_emulator_integration.py:35 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/fuzzmind_frida_mcp/tools/recipes/workflow.py:745 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detected.github/workflows/release-gate.yml:22 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/fuzzmind_frida_mcp/tools/recipes/workflow.py:374 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/fuzzmind_frida_mcp/tools/recipes/workflow.py:744 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_ios_simulator_permission.py:34 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_docker_vm_integration.py:41 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_ios_simulator_permission.py:16 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_real_frida_integration.py:55 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_ios_simulator_permission.py:48 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_real_frida_integration.py:235 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_real_frida_integration.py:227 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_docker_vm_integration.py:61 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_real_frida_integration.py:68 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
File permission modification commandtests/test_docker_vm_integration.py:90 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_ios_simulator_permission.py:35 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05What would make this Verified
20 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Text that tells the agent to ignore its instructions≈ +9 on the totalDelete phrases like "ignore previous instructions", "override", "bypass" from SKILL.md and tool descriptions. Describe what the skill does; do not instruct the agent about other rules.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim 0xca1x: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Does not do what the description says≈ +5 on the totalIn the sandbox the skill never performed the task it claims (no call to the service it is for). Make sure the happy path runs without extra setup, or describe the real behavior.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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