Skills/PyPI/fd-open-data-mcp

fd-open-data-mcp@0.5.63

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Open-data ontology MCP: a semantic concept layer over multi-datasource financial/economic data" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher finddatatechnology · publishing for 109 daysInstalls 2,801Last detonated 45 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
FD_OPEN_DATA_MCP_DATABASE_URLPG_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: EDGAR_IDENTITY, PG_DATABASE, PG_HOST, PG_PORT, PG_USER, POD_NAME, PRICE_CALIBER_ENFORCEMENT, REDIS_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso apple.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names apple.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects FD_OPEN_DATA_MCP_DATABASE_URL, PG_PASSWORD only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx fd-open-data-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; HTTP URL with a raw public IP address; HTTP URL with a raw public IP address. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/oss_sanitize.py:39 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesr"\.db$", r"\.pem$", r"\.key$", r"id_rsa", r"\.env$",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addressscripts/rotate_worker_credential.py:27 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot name--api-server https://100.64.0.13:6443 --verify-onlyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addressscripts/rotate_worker_credential.py:31 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot name--api-server https://100.64.0.13:6443 --mode bound --applyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/e2e_report.py:278 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addressscripts/rotate_worker_credential.py:31 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filtering--api-server https://100.64.0.13:6443 --mode bound --applyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/emit_scheduling_artifacts.py:265 · Python subprocess execution detectedkubectl = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addressscripts/rotate_worker_credential.py:27 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filtering--api-server https://100.64.0.13:6443 --verify-onlyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/rotate_worker_credential.py:57 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout, input=stdin)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/e2e_report.py:230 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addressscripts/rotate_worker_credential.py:23 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot name--api-server https://100.64.0.13:6443 --dry-runFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/oss_sanitize.py:72 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".sh", ".ini", ".cfg", ".html", ".js", ".css", ".env.example"}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addressscripts/rotate_worker_credential.py:23 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filtering--api-server https://100.64.0.13:6443 --dry-runFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/emit_scheduling_artifacts.py:261 · Python subprocess execution detectedlaunchctl = subprocess.run(["launchctl", "list"], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/emit_scheduling_artifacts.py:257 · Python subprocess execution detectedcrontab = subprocess.run(["crontab", "-l"], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/run_supervised_trial.py:123 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=SCRAW_DIR, env=env, capture_output=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈62 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for fd-open-data-mcp@0.5.63 as of 44 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim finddatatechnology: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. HTTP URL with a raw public IP address≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. URL using a raw public IP address≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
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