fc-mcp@0.9.8
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "MCP server exposing FC operations as MCP tools" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-10-31 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: OS command execution function call detected; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationst+CategoryObserved action
0.5sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
Static findings
CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedsetup.py:35 · OS command execution function call detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05HIGH
Privileged sudo commandci/setup.sh:7 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05HIGH
Privileged sudo commandci/setup.sh:6 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressfc_mcp/mcp_server.py:263 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddocker/fc_server/Dockerfile:20 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressdocker/fc_guarder/sample.env:1 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedfc_client/client.py:519 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressfc_guarder/guarder.py:22 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedfc_client/client.py:501 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddocker/fc_guarder/Dockerfile:13 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedfc_client/client.py:518 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detecteddocker/fc_client/Dockerfile:7 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressfc_mcp/mcp_server.py:263 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressdocker/fc_guarder/sample.env:1 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedfc_client/client.py:508 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedfc_client/client.py:202 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressfc_guarder/guarder.py:22 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detecteddocker/fc_guarder/Dockerfile:7 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detecteddocker/fc_server/Dockerfile:7 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddocker/fc_client/Dockerfile:14 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddocker/fc_server/Dockerfile:13 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim nxp: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Outbound HTTP to raw IP address≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
- URL using raw IP address≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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