Skills/PyPI/easy-searxng-mcp-server

easy-searxng-mcp-server@2026.11.21.2

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Open-source MCP server for SearXNG metasearch with VectorRAG reranking, audio transcription (FasterWhisper), and multi-format document support" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher sheldonrobinson · publishing for 6 daysInstalls 473Last detonated 34 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso searx.party, tavily.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx easy-searxng-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: OS command execution function call detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'
0.3sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.3sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.5sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'

Static findings

MEDIUM
URL with suspicious TLDsrc/main.py:368 · URL with suspicious TLD — commonly used for phishing/malwaresearxng_url = "https://searx.party"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedsetup.py:87 · OS command execution function call detectedresult = os.system(f"{sys.executable} {script_path}")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/main.py:438 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkapp = mcp_server.streamable_http_app(Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈81 tok
1 file · 31 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim sheldonrobinson: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  4. URL with suspicious TLD≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  5. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
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