Skills/PyPI/docx-mcp-server

docx-mcp-server@0.7.4

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "MCP server for creating, reading, and editing Word (.docx) documents with markdown conversion, track changes, comments, footnotes, tables, images, sections, and structural validation" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher securityronin · joined 4 days agoInstalls 1,775Last detonated 4d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-10-30 and scored it 66/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessexited 1:
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.1sprocessexec .venv/bin/docx-mcp
0.1sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/docx-mcp': No such file or directory
0.1sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_e2e.py:1841 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellinstall.sh:3 · Remote installer piped to shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_e2e.py:1493 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/conftest.py:65 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_content.py:64 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondocx_mcp/skill/SKILL.md:146 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_e2e.py:1843 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondocx_mcp/skill/SKILL.md:144 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/conftest.py:64 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_fuzz_smoke.py:63 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_content.py:62 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patterninstall.sh:3 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_e2e.py:1495 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLinstall.sh:3 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourceFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

What would make this Verified

14 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim securityronin: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Does not do what the description says≈ +5 on the totalIn the sandbox the skill never performed the task it claims (no call to the service it is for). Make sure the happy path runs without extra setup, or describe the real behavior.
  4. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. Hex-encoded string detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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