docusense-mcp@0.1.2
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server that lets AI agents read your PDFs and docs in sections, not wholesale: ~20x fewer tokens, hash-verified citations, version diffs" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso openxmlformats.org, groq.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
- Settings are DOCUSENSE_* variables, read from the environment, then ./.env, then $DOCUSENSE_HOME/.env.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.from docusense.mcp_server import http_appFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.model_config = SettingsConfigDict(env_prefix="DOCUSENSE_", env_file=(docusense_home() / ".env", ".env"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# Later files win, so a project-local .env overrides the per-user one.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.done = subprocess.run([claude, "mcp", "add", "--scope", "user", "docusense", "--", *cmd],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out._SPACES = str.maketrans({" ": " ", " ": " ", " ": " ", " ": " ", "": ""})Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.