Skills/PyPI/documint-mcp

documint-mcp@0.3.2

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Documint V1 backend for repo-native documentation operations" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher skeehn · joined 4 days agoInstalls 12Last detonated 4d ago

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-10-30 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Outbound HTTP to raw IP address; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.1sprocessexec .venv/bin/documint
0.1sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/documint': No such file or directory
0.1sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/dogfood.py:81 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/dogfood.py:95 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressapps/web/lib/api.ts:32 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressscripts/dogfood.py:157 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:42 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/setup-mcp.sh:52 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressapps/web/lib/api.ts:32 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:5 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/setup-mcp.sh:54 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressscripts/dogfood.py:158 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressscripts/dogfood.py:157 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:32 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:23 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/setup-mcp.sh:51 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:181 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addresssrc/documint_mcp/server.py:317 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/documint_mcp/config.py:411 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addresssrc/documint_mcp/config.py:238 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/setup-mcp.sh:53 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsscripts/setup-mcp.sh:55 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/documint_mcp/repository.py:3037 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressscripts/dogfood.py:158 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/documint_mcp/mcp_server.py:563 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addresssrc/documint_mcp/server.py:317 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addresssrc/documint_mcp/config.py:238 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/setup-mcp.sh:263 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/documint_mcp/cli.py:446 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/documint_mcp/intelligence_enricher.py:64 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/setup-mcp.sh:286 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/documint_mcp/git_bootstrap.py:75 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim skeehn: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Outbound HTTP to raw IP address≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. URL using raw IP address≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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