Skills/PyPI/docforge-mcp

docforge-mcp@0.2.1

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "MCP server for complete Office document manipulation — create, read, edit, convert DOCX/XLSX/PPTX/PDF/EML" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher filhocf · joined 4 days agoInstalls 116Last detonated 4d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-10-30 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; References a credential file in the home directory; References a credential file in the home directory. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.1sprocessexec .venv/bin/docforge-mcp
0.1sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/docforge-mcp': No such file or directory
0.1sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdocforge/config.py:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorydocforge/config.py:78 · References a credential file in the home directoryFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorydocforge/upload/backends/s3.py:131 · References a credential file in the home directoryFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorydocforge/upload/backends/s3.py:13 · References a credential file in the home directoryFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdocforge/config.py:78 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdocforge/config.py:79 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdocforge/config.py:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Excessive HTML entities detectedtests/test_xml_creation.py:270 · Excessive HTML entities detected — may be obfuscating contentFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_xml_creation.py:201 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdocforge/upload/backends/s3.py:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_xml_creation.py:146 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Excessive HTML entities detectedtests/test_xml_creation.py:271 · Excessive HTML entities detected — may be obfuscating contentFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_xml_creation.py:164 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_xml_creation.py:285 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_xml_creation.py:131 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontests/test_xml_creation.py:182 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdocforge/upload/backends/s3.py:131 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim filhocf: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Does not do what the description says≈ +5 on the totalIn the sandbox the skill never performed the task it claims (no call to the service it is for). Make sure the happy path runs without extra setup, or describe the real behavior.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Excessive HTML entities detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
  6. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
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