dlb-mcp@0.8.0
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Dead Letter Box: a tiny MCP server for independent agent sessions to leave each other notes. Fifteen tools, no daemon, real dead-letter semantics + task lifecycle. Includes dlb-monitor for push-like wake via Claude Code's Monitor tool." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
DLB_MONITOR_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: CLAUDE_CODE_SESSION_ID, DLB_MAX_BODY_BYTES, DLB_MAX_FIELD_BYTES, DLB_MAX_INBOX, DLB_MESSAGE_TTL_DAYS, DLB_MONITOR_INTERVAL, DLB_PROXY, DLB_READ_RECEIPTS, DLB_SESSION_ID, DLB_STORE, DLB_TAKEOVER_AFTER_SECONDS, DLB_WAKE_WINDOW_SECONDS- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for DLB_MONITOR_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
hiccup must not kill the wake source.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."""Close stdin (the worker exits on EOF); kill it if it lingers."""Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."""chmod 600 the SQLite file once it exists. Best-effort.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.monitor = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.self.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.must NOT kill the loop; must log, back off, and continue. We forceFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."""Persist name→reclaim_secret under <store_dir>/tokens/<sha256(name)> (chmodFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.(Ctrl-C → exit 0) and a real process-kill (SIGKILL → uncatchable; theFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""Path to `name`'s reclaim sidecar. The file (chmod 600) holds two lines:Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.- runtime errors don't kill the loopFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.monitor = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.monitor = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for dlb-mcp@0.8.0 as of 18 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.