Skills/PyPI/db-conn-mcp

db-conn-mcp@0.8.2

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "A dead-simple, self-hosted MCP server for securely querying databases via AI agents." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher idle-sync · publishing for 164 daysInstalls 371Last detonated 2d ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx db-conn-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/db_conn_mcp/server.py:239 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges- Debian/Ubuntu: sudo apt-get install -y postgresql-clientFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/db_conn_mcp/dialects/postgres.py:628 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"`sudo apt-get install -y postgresql-client`; RHEL/Fedora `sudo dnf install -y postgresql`."Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsCLAUDE.md:56 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- **Secrets sanitation:** never commit `connections.json` or `.env` (both git-ignored); never print or log DSNs, hosts, or credentials; keep all error/diagnostic output sanitized (see Rule 6).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_mutation_check.py:49 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(command, cwd=repo, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentsrc/db_conn_mcp/gui/static/index.html:14 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent · informational: not an instruction fileThe same token, for the page's own fetches. A visit authenticated by the session cookie arrives with no query string for app.js to read - the cookie is HttpOnlyFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/db_conn_mcp/gui/app.py:808 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod only tightens a file that already existed. The mode is advisory onFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_config.py:369 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/db_conn_mcp/doctor.py:350 · Python subprocess execution detectedignored = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
Rule modification attemptdocs/PRD.md:26 · Rule modification attempt — overwriting existing instructions · informational: not an instruction file…u-mean for a near-miss spelling — parameter **names only**, never their values (Rule 6: a value can be a DSN). Unknown *tool* names keep the SDK's own error. - **Self-…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/db_conn_mcp/atomic_write.py:47 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionswrite-then-chmod leaves the contents on disk at the umask default (typically 0644)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/db_conn_mcp/doctor.py:336 · Python subprocess execution detectedinside = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
HTML that renders invisible but is read by the agentsrc/db_conn_mcp/gui/static/index.html:25 · HTML that renders invisible but is read by the agent · informational: not an instruction fileThe dashboard's host process stopped. Run <code>db-conn-mcp gui</code> to bring it back.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagetests/test_cli.py:333 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code@pytest.mark.parametrize("raw", ["npx -y pkg", "[]", '[""]', '["npx", 3]', '{"command": "npx"}'])Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/db_conn_mcp/verify.py:199 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.Popen( # noqa: S603 — command comes from our own config entriesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/mutation_check.py:396 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/mutation_check.py:423 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_doctor.py:159 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", str(tmp_path)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
LOW
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentsrc/db_conn_mcp/gui/static/index.html:7 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent · informational: not an instruction fileThe asset URLs carry the session token: every request is guarded, and a browser does not copy the page's query string onto its subresource loads. The server subFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionCLAUDE.md:56 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files- **Secrets sanitation:** never commit `connections.json` or `.env` (both git-ignored); never print or log DSNs, hosts, or credentials; keep all error/diagnostic output sanitized (see Rule 6).Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/db_conn_mcp/gui/app.py:806 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionswrite-then-chmod leaves the secret on disk at the umask default (typicallyFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/db_conn_mcp/doctor.py:312 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsf"run: chmod 600 {path}",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/db_conn_mcp/server.py:240 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges- RHEL/Fedora: sudo dnf install -y postgresqlFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_postgres.py:1667 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloads_EXPECTED_SSL_REQUEST = b"\x00\x00\x00\x08\x04\xd2\x16\x2f"Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/db_conn_mcp/server.py:1004 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesconnections"; pair with cancel_query(pid) to kill a stuck statement.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/db_conn_mcp/server.py:418 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesDDL inline (or writes `{database}_schema_{UTC}.sql` when output_dir is set). IfFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_doctor.py:147 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", str(tmp_path)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/mutation_check.py:130 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagetests/test_cli.py:310 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code# The npm launcher names itself, so a client set up through npx keeps using npx.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/mutation_check.py:375 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,779 tok
2 files · 73 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for db-conn-mcp@0.8.2 as of 2d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim idle-sync: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  6. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim idle-syncPropose a patch to the maintainer