databricks-mcp-genie@1.0.0
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "MCP server for Databricks with enhanced Genie AI integration - natural language data analysis" Observed in sandbox: calls astral.sh only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-10-29 and scored it 63/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: calls astral.sh only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenariost+CategoryObserved action
0.1snetworkCONNECT https://astral.sh · undeclared
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.1sprocessexited 127: ./scripts/setup.sh: line 20: uv: command not found
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.2sprocessexec .venv/bin/databricks-mcp-server
0.2sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/databricks-mcp-server': No such file or directory
0.2sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
Static findings
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/setup.sh:10 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdatabricks_mcp/core/config.py:14 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdatabricks_mcp/core/config.py:22 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/setup_codespaces.sh:18 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternscripts/test_setup_local.sh:13 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/run_mcp_client_test.sh:38 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdatabricks_mcp/core/config.py:19 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdatabricks_mcp/core/config.py:75 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup_codespaces.sh:13 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/setup.sh:10 · Remote installer piped to shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07HIGH
Privileged sudo commandscripts/setup_codespaces.sh:9 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/setup_codespaces.sh:18 · Remote installer piped to shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07MEDIUM
Process kill commandscripts/run_list_tools.sh:38 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellscripts/test_setup_local.sh:13 · Remote installer piped to shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07MEDIUM
Process kill commandtest_server.sh:15 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/test_setup_local.sh:62 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/setup_codespaces.sh:66 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/test_setup_local.sh:61 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05What would make this Verified
17 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim sid-sid: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Does not do what the description says≈ +5 on the totalIn the sandbox the skill never performed the task it claims (no call to the service it is for). Make sure the happy path runs without extra setup, or describe the real behavior.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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