cscec-gwdoc-mcp@0.5.5
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "中建企业公文 Word(.docx)生成 stdio MCP 服务,供百炼函数计算 uvx 托管接入。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
OSS_ACCESS_KEY_IDOSS_ACCESS_KEY_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: OSS_BUCKET, OSS_ENDPOINT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso aliyuncs.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names aliyuncs.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects OSS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, OSS_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 0.3.8
vet-skills diff cscec-gwdoc-mcp 0.3.8 0.5.5This version reaches for something 0.3.8 did not: 2 new credential variables (OSS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, OSS_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
- New credential variables
- OSS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, OSS_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET
0.5.5 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
No findings across 2,300 lines in 12 files.
Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.