Skills/PyPI/cscec-gwdoc-mcp

cscec-gwdoc-mcp@0.5.5

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "中建企业公文 Word(.docx)生成 stdio MCP 服务,供百炼函数计算 uvx 托管接入。" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher cscec · publishing for 9 daysInstalls 2,535Last detonated 22 min ago
$claude mcp add cscec-gwdoc-mcp -- uvx cscec-gwdoc-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
OSS_ACCESS_KEY_IDOSS_ACCESS_KEY_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: OSS_BUCKET, OSS_ENDPOINT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso aliyuncs.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names aliyuncs.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects OSS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, OSS_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx cscec-gwdoc-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.3.8

vet-skills diff cscec-gwdoc-mcp 0.3.8 0.5.5

This version reaches for something 0.3.8 did not: 2 new credential variables (OSS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, OSS_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New credential variables
OSS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, OSS_ACCESS_KEY_SECRET

0.5.5 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

No findings across 2,300 lines in 12 files.

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈51 tok
1 file · 12 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.