Skills/PyPI/crossref-mcp

crossref-mcp@0.1.0

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "MCP server wrapping the Crossref REST API for scholarly metadata." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher jtl-neo · joined 5 days agoInstalls 124Last detonated 5d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-10-29 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.1sprocessexec .venv/bin/crossref-mcp
0.1sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/crossref-mcp': No such file or directory
0.1sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.yml:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/crossref_mcp/config.py:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.proxy.yml:21 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.proxy.yml:33 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo command.github/workflows/ci.yml:120 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.proxy.yml:20 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.redis.yml:29 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.proxy.yml:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathsdocker-compose.redis.yml:3 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL.github/workflows/ci.yml:38 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourceFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shell.github/workflows/ci.yml:38 · Remote installer piped to shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Pipe-to-shell pattern.github/workflows/ci.yml:38 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim jtl-neo: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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