Skills/PyPI/crawlengine-mcp

crawlengine-mcp@2.0.1

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "HTTP web extraction, browser header rotation, proxy pool management, and clean Markdown MCP server for AI agents" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher johannschiffer · joined 5 days agoInstalls 0Last detonated 5d ago
$claude mcp add crawlengine-mcp -- uvx crawlengine-mcp
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Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-10-29 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.1sprocessexec .venv/bin/crawlengine-mcp
0.1sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/crawlengine-mcp': No such file or directory
0.1sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_security_hardening.py:56 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_security_hardening.py:22 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_genesis_entrypoints.py:5 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addresstests/test_security_hardening.py:20 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_security_hardening.py:65 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addresstests/test_security_hardening.py:19 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addresstests/test_security_hardening.py:20 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addresstests/test_security_hardening.py:19 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07