codex-dobby-mcp@0.1.4
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Local stdio MCP delegation server that routes Claude-orchestrated tasks through codex exec" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
probe = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-c", "import coverage"], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# lands in last_message.txt via --output-last-message; --json layersFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.# this gate a simply-broken test scores as a kill for every mutation —Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# A kill is positive evidence: a test failed. A survivor is anFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run(["git", "worktree", "prune"], cwd=REPO, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# mutation that was never applied. A false kill is the exact outcomeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(["git", *args], cwd=REPO, capture_output=True, text=True, env=env)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.unparseable and kill the whole orchestrated review.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.flaky client cannot kill the forwarder mid-run.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- Prove that named tests kill hand-written mutations:Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- Extra root access note: {extra_root_access_note}Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.reported a kill that the intended mutation had nothing to do with.)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", str(repo_root)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.…s (permission denied). If sessions were created using sudo, fix ownership: sudo chown -R $(whoami) /Users/avery/.codex (underlying error: Operation not permitted (os …Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", str(repo_root)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.assert _codex_home_permission_issue([], stderr="permission denied: /etc/shadow") is NoneFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.help_text = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", str(repo_root)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), "add", "-A"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo_root), "config", "user.email", "[email protected]"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.completed = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", str(repo)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", str(repo_root)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", str(repo_root)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo), "add", "-A"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", str(repo)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.b"If sessions were created using sudo, fix ownership: sudo chown -R $(whoami) "Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", str(repo)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# live pipe. Shielded so the kill escalation survives aFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", str(repo_root)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", str(repo_root)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", str(repo)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", str(repo_root)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.…ssions (permission denied). If sessions were created using sudo, fix ownership: sudo chown -R $(whoami) /Users/avery/.codex (underlying error: Operation not permitte…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", str(repo_root)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", str(repo_root)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.b"If sessions were created using sudo, fix ownership: sudo chown -R $(whoami) "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.("/etc/passwd", False),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo_root), "config", "user.name", "test"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.completed = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.help_text = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", str(repo_root)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.("del_and_bom", "text \x7f del \ufeff bom"),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.If you use Dobby from Claude Code, add this to your `CLAUDE.md` so Claude delegates correctly:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo_root), "config", "user.name", "t"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo_root), "commit", "-q", "-m", "init"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo_root), "add", "-A"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.("see `/etc/passwd.py` for detail", []),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo_root), "config", "user.email", "[email protected]"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", str(repo)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.If you use Dobby from Claude Code, add this to your `CLAUDE.md` so Claude delegates correctly:Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.("see /etc/passwd.py for detail", []),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(["git", "init", "-q", str(repo_root)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo_root), "add", "-A"], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for codex-dobby-mcp@0.1.4 as of 47 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.