code-weaver@0.1.0a3
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Extensible MCP server for semantic code search with plugin architecture supporting multiple embedding providers, vector databases, and data sources." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
AWS_SECRETS_MANAGER_ENDPOINT_URLAWS_SECRETS_MANAGER_REGIONAWS_SECRETS_MANAGER_SECRET_IDGOOGLE_SECRET_MANAGER_PROJECT_IDConfiguration, not credentials: AZURE_KEY_VAULT_URL, CODEWEAVER__UVICORN__PORT, CODEWEAVER_CONFIG_FILE, CODEWEAVER_HOST, CODEWEAVER_LOG_LEVEL, CODEWEAVER_MCP_PORT, CODEWEAVER_PORT, CODEWEAVER_PROFILE, CODEWEAVER_PROJECT_NAME, CODEWEAVER_PROJECT_PATH, CODEWEAVER_VECTOR_STORE_URL, MISE_INSTALL_PATH, STACK_YAML, TERM_PROGRAM- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso pydantic.dev, python.org, githubusercontent.com, jdx.dev, askubuntu.com, apple.com, nssm.cc, posthog.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names pydantic.dev, python.org, githubusercontent.com, jdx.dev, askubuntu.com, apple.com, nssm.cc, posthog.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects AWS_SECRETS_MANAGER_ENDPOINT_URL, AWS_SECRETS_MANAGER_REGION, AWS_SECRETS_MANAGER_SECRET_ID, GOOGLE_SECRET_MANAGER_PROJECT_ID only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-10 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# FASTMCP_SERVER_AUTH_AUTHKITPROVIDER_AUTHKIT_DOMAIN="https://your-project-12345.authkit.app"Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.# FASTMCP_SERVER_AUTH_AUTHKITPROVIDER_BASE_URL="http://localhost:8000"Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.- .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.3. dotenv_settings - .env files:Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.".env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# Java's more common than Kotlin, but Kotlin is more likely to use 'build.gradle.kts' ... I think. 🤷♂️Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.if grep -q "VOYAGE_API_KEY=your-" .env 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.echo -n "Checking .env file... "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if [ -f ".env" ]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.git_describe = subprocess.run( # noqa: S603Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.DirectoryName(".env"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- .codeweaver/.envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if grep -q "VOYAGE_API_KEY=" .env 2>/dev/null; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# Check .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.".codeweaver/.env",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.output = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["/bin/launchctl", "unload", str(plist_file)], capture_output=True) # noqa: S603Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run( # noqa: S603Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.Popen([cw_cmd, *cw_args], **kwargs) # noqa: S603Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.else DictView(FastMcpServerSettingsDict(**FastMcpHttpServerSettings().as_settings()))Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.output = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.output = subprocess.run([git, "--version"], capture_output=True, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.output = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.http_settings = DictView(FastMcpServerSettingsDict(**cast(dict, http_settings)))Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.mcp_server=FastMcpHttpServerSettings().as_settings(),Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.output = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for code-weaver@0.1.0a3 as of 4d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim knitli: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.