cliver-playbook-app-mcp@0.3.0
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "cliver-playbook agent surface: MCP server (streamable-http + stdio) on top of the identity stack" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 8 of 16 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
MCP_BEARER_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_AGENT_ID, MCP_AGENT_TYPE- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MCP_BEARER_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 0.1.0
vet-skills diff cliver-playbook-app-mcp 0.1.0 0.3.0This version reaches for something 0.1.0 did not: 1 new credential variable (MCP_BEARER_TOKEN). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
- New credential variables
- MCP_BEARER_TOKEN
0.1.0 was not run in the sandbox (static only); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."database_url from app.yaml/.env/environment."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.spec.loader.exec_module(module)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.# The MCP SDK: server (fastmcp-style MCPServer), streamable-http transport,Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.