Skills/PyPI/clevertech-mcp-server

clevertech-mcp-server@0.4.2

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "CleverTech MCP server — Canadian government data for AI agents: property, permits, zoning, business registry, and GPS ↔ DLS conversion. Free tier available." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server) · listed in the official MCP RegistryPublisher clevertech-dev · publishing for 158 daysInstalls 354Last detonated 3 h ago

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
CLEVERTECH_API_KEYRAILWAY_API_TOKENRAILWAY_TOKENSENTRY_DSNConfiguration, not credentials: CLEVERTECH_API_URL, RAIL, RATE_LIMIT_ANON_BURST, RATE_LIMIT_ANON_DAILY, TRANSPORT
Where it talks to
clevertech.ca (its own)Also python.org, astral.sh, railway.app — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names python.org, astral.sh, railway.app as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CLEVERTECH_API_KEY, RAILWAY_API_TOKEN, RAILWAY_TOKEN, SENTRY_DSN only into requests to clevertech.ca (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets CLEVERTECH_API_KEY=clevertech.ca,RAILWAY_API_TOKEN=clevertech.ca,RAILWAY_TOKEN=clevertech.ca,SENTRY_DSN=clevertech.ca -- uvx clevertech-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 20 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
20sprocessexec /usr/bin/which
20sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · uv is required. Install: curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh
20sprocessscript backend runs setup only
20sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedrailway_custom_domain.py:11 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/clevertech_mcp/server.py:774 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx @clevertech/mcp-serverFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellbin/run.js:15 · Remote installer piped to shellconsole.error('uv is required. Install: curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh');Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedocs/agents.md:10 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx @clevertech/mcp-serverFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedocs/agents.md:51 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx @clevertech/mcp-serverFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:7 · Destructive file system command detectedrm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)Dockerfile:22 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkCMD uv run clevertech-mcp-server --transport sse --host 0.0.0.0 --port ${PORT:-8001}Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternbin/run.js:15 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeconsole.error('uv is required. Install: curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh');Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,238 tok
2 files · 57 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for clevertech-mcp-server@0.4.2 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim clevertech-dev: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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