clevertech-mcp-server@0.4.2
CAUTION· startup onlyPublisher claims: "CleverTech MCP server — Canadian government data for AI agents: property, permits, zoning, business registry, and GPS ↔ DLS conversion. Free tier available." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
CLEVERTECH_API_KEYRAILWAY_API_TOKENRAILWAY_TOKENSENTRY_DSNConfiguration, not credentials: CLEVERTECH_API_URL, RAIL, RATE_LIMIT_ANON_BURST, RATE_LIMIT_ANON_DAILY, TRANSPORT- Where it talks to
- clevertech.ca (its own)Also python.org, astral.sh, railway.app — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names python.org, astral.sh, railway.app as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CLEVERTECH_API_KEY, RAILWAY_API_TOKEN, RAILWAY_TOKEN, SENTRY_DSN only into requests to clevertech.ca (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 20 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.npx @clevertech/mcp-serverFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.console.error('uv is required. Install: curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh');Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.npx @clevertech/mcp-serverFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx @clevertech/mcp-serverFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.CMD uv run clevertech-mcp-server --transport sse --host 0.0.0.0 --port ${PORT:-8001}Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.console.error('uv is required. Install: curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh');Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for clevertech-mcp-server@0.4.2 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim clevertech-dev: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.