claude-remote-mcp-gateway@0.1.2
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Public MCP server that exposes Claude Code session tools and forwards them to agent-bridge" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
AGENT_BRIDGE_TOKENLEGACY_TOKENMCP_GATEWAY_TOKENREMOVE_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: INGRESS_PATH, MCP_GATEWAY_PORT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso claude.ai, astral.sh, cloudflare.com, claude.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names claude.ai, astral.sh, cloudflare.com, claude.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects AGENT_BRIDGE_TOKEN, LEGACY_TOKEN, MCP_GATEWAY_TOKEN, REMOVE_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
parser.add_argument("--state-dir", type=Path, help="default: MCP_GATEWAY_STATE_DIR, also from .env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""Run as root (`sudo mcp-gateway bridges …` without the wrapper), drops to the userFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# later with `sudo mcp-gateway enroll`, which this script installs. The gateway listens onFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# `sudo mcp-gateway bridges …` runs as the service user, so bridges.json stays its own.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.exec sudo --preserve-env=AGENT_BRIDGE_TOKEN -u $SERVICE_USER /usr/bin/env MCP_GATEWAY_PORT=$PORT $VENV/bin/mcp-gateway --state-dir $STATE_DIR "\$@"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.ENV_FILE = ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…$LEGACY_URL. Re-run without AGENT_BRIDGE_URL to import it, then change it with: sudo mcp-gateway bridges remove <name>, sudo mcp-gateway bridges add $AGENT_BRIDGE_UR…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.ExecStart=$CLOUDFLARED --no-autoupdate tunnel --config $TUNNEL_CONFIG runFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.# sudo --preserve-env=AGENT_BRIDGE_TOKEN; never from the command line, where others see it.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# No env_file here: only from_env() reads `.env`, so constructing Settings directlyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."""Settings read from MCP_GATEWAY_* environment variables, or a `.env` file in the workingFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# What setup.sh reads from its environment, which sudo would otherwise drop.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chown root:"$SERVICE_USER" "$ENV_FILE"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod 0755 /usr/local/bin/mcp-gatewayFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod 0640 "$ENV_FILE"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts."No enrollment is open on the gateway. Run `sudo mcp-gateway enroll` there for a new string.",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["uv", "build", "--wheel", "--out-dir", str(tmp_path), str(PYPROJECT.parent)],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Path(".env").write_text(Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# from_env reads .env from the working directory; start each test without one.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# E.g. `mcp-gateway bridges list` without sudo on the gateway host's mode-700 folder.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chown "$CF_USER":"$CF_USER" "$CREDENTIALS"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.chmod 0600 "$ORIGIN_CERT"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.# For a run without a terminal, e.g. setup.sh with sudo --preserve-env=AGENT_BRIDGE_TOKEN.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.NO_HOSTS = "No agent hosts are set up. Add one on the gateway host with `sudo mcp-gateway bridges add <url>`."Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.["http://8.8.8.8:8765", "http://100.64.0.1:8765", "http://agents.example.com:8765", "http://0.0.0.0:8765"],Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.return TestClient(self.app, base_url="http://192.168.1.10:8766", client=peer)Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.assert (code, out) == (0, "Added mac (darwin, agent-bridge 0.1.0) at http://192.168.1.20:8765.\n")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.["http://8.8.8.8:8765", "http://100.64.0.1:8765", "http://agents.example.com:8765", "http://0.0.0.0:8765"],Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.monkeypatch.chdir(tmp_path) # away from any .env, which main() would readFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.assert "sudo mcp-gateway enroll" in response.json()["error"]["message"]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# In another process, as `sudo mcp-gateway bridges remove mac` runs.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.gateway.bridges["http://192.168.1.21:8765"] = httpx.Response(200, json={**INFO, "bridge_id": "2" * 32})Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.raise ValueError("must be the agent-bridge's address, like http://192.168.1.20:8765")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.assert is_error and text.endswith("Add one on the gateway host with `sudo mcp-gateway bridges add <url>`.")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.second = gateway.enroll(secret, bridge_id="2" * 32, url="http://192.168.1.21:8765", name="linux")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.@pytest.mark.parametrize(("field", "value"), [("url", "http://192.168.1.20:87a5"), ("token", "abcą")])Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.assert is_error and text.endswith("Add one on the gateway host with `sudo mcp-gateway bridges add <url>`.")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.code, out, _ = bridges("add", "http://192.168.1.20:8765/")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.assert is_error and text.endswith("Add one on the gateway host with `sudo mcp-gateway bridges add <url>`.")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.raise Refused(422, "bad_url", "The address must be like http://192.168.1.20:8765.")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.assert is_error and text.endswith("Add one on the gateway host with `sudo mcp-gateway bridges add <url>`.")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# Each one sudo would otherwise drop, since the script reads it from its environment.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.bridge = registry.add("mac", "http://192.168.1.20:8765", "t" * 32, INFO)Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls."mac", "http://192.168.1.20:8765", TOKEN, INFOFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.URL = "http://192.168.1.20:8765"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls."url", ["mac:8765", "ftp://mac", "http://", "http://mac:8765/api", "http://192.168.1.20:87a5", "http://[::1"]Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.assert code == 1 and "like http://192.168.1.20:8765" in errFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls."bridge_id": bridge.bridge_id, "name": "mac", "url": "http://192.168.1.20:8765", "token": "t" * 32,Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.EXAMPLE_URL = "http://192.168.1.20:8765"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for claude-remote-mcp-gateway@0.1.2 as of 20 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim placheckij: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.