Skills/PyPI/chuk-mcp-ios

chuk-mcp-ios@0.1.5

VERIFIED

Publisher claims: "iOS Device Control MCP Server - Comprehensive iOS automation and testing" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher chrishayuk · joined 6 days agoInstalls 34Last detonated 6d ago
$claude mcp add chuk-mcp-ios -- uvx chuk-mcp-ios
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Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-10-28 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

CRITICAL
Prompt injectionREADME.md:28 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:567 · Authorization escalation languageFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/chuk_mcp_ios/core/base.py:221 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/chuk_mcp_ios/core/base.py:72 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:569 · Authorization escalation languageFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/chuk_mcp_ios/core/base.py:234 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionREADME.md:569 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionREADME.md:567 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/chuk_mcp_ios/core/base.py:260 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/chuk_mcp_ios/devices/simulator.py:299 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/chuk_mcp_ios/devices/real_device.py:283 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/chuk_mcp_ios/core/base.py:247 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
Context shift attemptREADME.md:567 · Context shift attempt — trying to change operational modeFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/chuk_mcp_ios/core/logger_manager.py:548 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:28 · Authorization escalation languageFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01