chimeralang-mcp@0.8.4
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "ChimeraLang MCP Server — probabilistic types, consensus gates, and hallucination detection as Claude tools" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher fernandogarzaaa · joined 1 days agoInstalls 982Last detonated 15 h ago
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-10-28 and scored it 69/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompt injection attempt; Authorization escalation language; Prompt injection. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationst+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.1sprocessexec .venv/bin/chimeralang-mcp
0.1sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/chimeralang-mcp': No such file or directory
0.1sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
Static findings
CRITICAL
Prompt injection attemptBLUEPRINT.md:185 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions'Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01HIGH
Authorization escalation languagetools/halubench/README.md:141 · Authorization escalation languageFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01CRITICAL
Prompt injectiontools/halubench/README.md:141 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_advanced_token_tools.py:348 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05CRITICAL
Prompt injection attempttools/halubench/README.md:140 · Prompt injection attempt — 'ignore previous instructions'Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_session_token_tools.py:110 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
URL using raw IP address.github/workflows/ci.yml:83 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07MEDIUM
Outbound HTTP to raw IP address.github/workflows/ci.yml:83 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_advanced_token_tools.py:301 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_hook_and_verify_perf.py:76 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Outbound HTTP to raw IP address.github/workflows/ci.yml:69 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07CRITICAL
Fake instruction boundary tagAGENTS.md:141 · Fake instruction boundary tagFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_advanced_token_tools.py:371 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
URL using raw IP address.github/workflows/ci.yml:69 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known package.github/workflows/ci.yml:83 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06MEDIUM
Process kill command.github/workflows/ci.yml:93 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05What would make this Verified
11 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Text that tells the agent to ignore its instructions≈ +9 on the totalDelete phrases like "ignore previous instructions", "override", "bypass" from SKILL.md and tool descriptions. Describe what the skill does; do not instruct the agent about other rules.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim fernandogarzaaa: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Does not do what the description says≈ +5 on the totalIn the sandbox the skill never performed the task it claims (no call to the service it is for). Make sure the happy path runs without extra setup, or describe the real behavior.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- URL using raw IP address≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
- Outbound HTTP to raw IP address≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
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