canforge-mcp@0.2.0
VERIFIEDPublisher claims: "Local, read-only MCP tools for CAN databases and capture logs" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-10-28 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationst+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.1sprocessexec .venv/bin/canforge-mcp
0.1sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/canforge-mcp': No such file or directory
0.1sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
Static findings
CRITICAL
Prompt injectionREADME.md:81 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique referenceFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01CRITICAL
Context shift attemptREADME.md:81 · Context shift attempt — trying to change operational modeFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01HIGH
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:81 · Authorization escalation languageFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedbenchmarks/run.py:123 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05