Skills/PyPI/bowerbird-mcp

bowerbird-mcp@2.1.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Manage knowledge, retrieve it, and verify it: keyword and semantic search over Markdown, ADR and MADR, OKF, SKOS and AsciiDoc (ADOC), and a human review (seal) bound to the exact text. An MCP server and CLI." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher dfoulks1 · publishing for 5 daysInstalls 416Last detonated 35 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso postgresql.org, schemastore.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx bowerbird-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentREADME.md:49 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent--8<-- [start:run]Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbowerbird_mcp.py:86 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Your id, prefilled in confirmation prompts. Personal: prefer KB_USER in .env (git user.email is the fallback).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbowerbird_mcp.py:75 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesSHARED_ONLY = {"format", "seal"} # what the folder is, and who must review it: only kbmcp.yaml sets these, never .env or the environmentFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbowerbird_mcp.py:81 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# or set KB_* environment variables; the environment wins over .env, and .env wins over this file, except for `format`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:68 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction filename one with `--config`, so a server needs no env block. A `kbmcp.yaml` in a folder below the root overrides theFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedbowerbird_mcp.py:3010 · Python subprocess execution detectedself.p = subprocess.Popen(["git", "cat-file", "--batch"], cwd=top, stdin=subprocess.PIPE,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedbowerbird_mcp.py:298 · Python subprocess execution detectedg = subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(KB_ROOT), "ls-files", "-co", "--exclude-standard", "-z", "--", f":(glob)**/{CONFIG}"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentREADME.md:185 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent--8<-- [end:run]Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedbowerbird_mcp.py:2941 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(["git", "-c", "core.quotePath=false", *a], cwd=cwd, capture_output=True, text=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsbowerbird_mcp.py:80 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# uncomment a line to change it. Personal or machine settings do not go here: copy env.example to .env (not committed)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈89 tok
1 file · 15 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim dfoulks1: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim dfoulks1Propose a patch to the maintainer