baton-mcp@0.1.0
VERIFIEDPublisher claims: "Cross-agent memory handoff via MCP — agents pass the baton instead of re-exploring the repo" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-10-28 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationst+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.4sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.4sprocessexec .venv/bin/baton
0.4sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/baton': No such file or directory
0.4sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
Static findings
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/baton/init_cmd.py:102 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07No other findings across 1,503 lines in 16 files.