awslabs.kinesis-mcp-server@0.1.3
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "An AWS Labs Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for kinesis" Observed in sandbox: calls astral.sh only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario) on 2026-10-27 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: calls astral.sh only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenariost+CategoryObserved action
0.2sfilesystemwrote ~/.aws/amazonq/mcp.json
0.2snetworkCONNECT https://astral.sh · undeclared
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/uname
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/mkdir
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/cat
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
Static findings
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)awslabs/kinesis_mcp_server/server.py:1561 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:64 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)awslabs/kinesis_mcp_server/server.py:77 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:61 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellinstall.sh:27 · Remote installer piped to shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_mcp.py:34 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patterninstall.sh:27 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_mcp.py:66 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05What would make this Verified
5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Reads credential files≈ +27 on the totalThe sandbox saw reads under ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, ~/.config or similar. Read only files inside the project, and only the ones the task needs. Seen: ~/.aws/amazonq/mcp.json.
- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim jbrub: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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