Skills/PyPI/awslabs.aws-location-mcp-server

awslabs.aws-location-mcp-server@2.1.2

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "An AWS Labs Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for AWS Location Service" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher awslabs · publishing for 596 daysInstalls 13,017Last detonated 20 min ago
$claude mcp add awslabs.aws-location-mcp-server -- uvx awslabs.aws-location-mcp-server
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
AWS_ACCESS_KEY_IDAWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEYAWS_SESSION_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: AWS_REGION, FASTMCP_LOG_LEVEL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY, AWS_SESSION_TOKEN and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx awslabs.aws-location-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 2.1.1

vet-skills diff awslabs.aws-location-mcp-server 2.1.1 2.1.2

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 2.1.1 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 90/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.0sprocessexited 1: ./docker-healthcheck.sh: line 19: pgrep: command not found
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'boto3'
0.1sprocess2 of 2 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
AWS access key pattern detectedtests/test_server.py:1231 · AWS access key pattern detected — possible hardcoded or harvested key'AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID', 'AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE'Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:71 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod o+x /rootFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
AWS access key pattern detectedtests/test_server.py:1243 · AWS access key pattern detected — possible hardcoded or harvested keyassert kwargs['aws_access_key_id'] == 'AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE'Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
MEDIUM
AWS access key pattern detectedtests/test_server.py:1032 · AWS access key pattern detected — possible hardcoded or harvested key'AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID', 'AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE'Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
MEDIUM
AWS access key pattern detectedtests/test_server.py:1045 · AWS access key pattern detected — possible hardcoded or harvested keykwargs['aws_access_key_id'] == 'AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE'Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
MEDIUM
AWS access key pattern detectedtests/test_server.py:1258 · AWS access key pattern detected — possible hardcoded or harvested key'AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID', 'AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE'Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈64 tok
1 file · 17 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.