Skills/PyPI/augments-mcp-server

augments-mcp-server@2.0.2

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Augments MCP Server - A comprehensive framework documentation provider for Claude Code" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server) · listed in the official MCP RegistryPublisher augmnt · publishing for 433 daysInstalls 301Last detonated 6 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
GITHUB_TOKENMASTER_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: AUGMENTS_CACHE_DIR, BLOCK_DIRECT_ACCESS, ENFORCE_CLOUDFLARE, ENV, REDIS_URL, WORKERS
Where it talks to
augments.dev (its own)Also nextjs.org, react.dev, tailwindcss.com, tiangolo.com, cloudflare.com, mongodb-api.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names nextjs.org, react.dev, tailwindcss.com, tiangolo.com, cloudflare.com, mongodb-api.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects GITHUB_TOKEN, MASTER_API_KEY only into requests to augments.dev (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets GITHUB_TOKEN=augments.dev,MASTER_API_KEY=augments.dev -- uvx augments-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/augments_mcp/tools/documentation_never_fail.py:293 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx create-react-app my-appFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
LOW
Unpinned dependencysrc/augments_mcp/tools/documentation_never_fail.py:189 · Unpinned dependencynpm install next@latest react@latest react-dom@latestFix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
AST06
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationsrc/augments_mcp/registry/manager.py:18 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime"""File system event handler for hot-reloading framework configs."""Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/augments_mcp/tools/documentation_never_fail.py:583 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx tailwindcss initFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_utils.py:52 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert validate_file_path("../../../etc/passwd") is FalseFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/augments_mcp/middleware/abuse_detector.py:189 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".env", ".git", ".config", # Sensitive filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codesrc/augments_mcp/middleware/abuse_detector.py:188 · Python exec or eval of computed code"eval(", "exec(", # Code executionFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/augments_mcp/server.py:42 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load environment variables from .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)pyproject.toml:22 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkurls = {Homepage = "https://augments.dev", Repository = "https://github.com/augmnt/augments-mcp-server", Issues = "https://github.com/augmnt/augments-mcp-server/issues"}Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈61 tok
1 file · 50 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for augments-mcp-server@2.0.2 as of 6 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim augmnt: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  3. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Python exec or eval of computed code≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
  6. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
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