atengk-mcp-server-reverse@1.2.0
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "专为 AI Agent 打造的跨平台二进制静态逆向分析与数字取证 MCP Server(原生支持 PE / ELF / Mach-O,内置 LIEF + Capstone + pefile 内核并按需挂载 radare2 / objdump / floss)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-10-27 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Fake instruction boundary tag. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationst+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.1sprocessexec .venv/bin/mcp-server-reverse
0.1sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/mcp-server-reverse': No such file or directory
0.1sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
Static findings
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandscripts/commit.sh:143 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/fixtures/synthetic.py:466 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_server_reverse/core/locator.py:245 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_scanner.py:51 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_scanner.py:50 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/fixtures/synthetic.py:523 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/mcp_server_reverse/core/locator.py:30 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addresstests/test_strings.py:50 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/mcp_server_reverse/core/locator.py:34 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:30 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/fixtures/synthetic.py:757 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07CRITICAL
Fake instruction boundary tagdocs/agents/domain.md:9 · Fake instruction boundary tagFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addresstests/test_strings.py:50 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/fixtures/synthetic.py:342 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/mcp_server_reverse/core/strings.py:183 · Python subprocess execution detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_security.py:141 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedDockerfile:22 · Destructive file system command detectedFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/fixtures/synthetic.py:489 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_patch_tools.py:18 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04What would make this Verified
7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim atengk: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Hex-encoded string detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Outbound HTTP to raw IP address≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
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