apple-calendar-eventkit-mcp@0.4.1
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server that lets Claude read and manage Apple Calendar and Reminders on macOS via EventKit" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
AUTH_RATE_LIMITCALDAV_PASSWORDCONNECTOR_PASSWORDOAUTH_ALLOW_LOCALHOSTOAUTH_ALLOWED_REDIRECTSOAUTH_KVOAUTH_PROVIDERConfiguration, not credentials: BACKEND, CALDAV_DEFAULT_CALENDAR, CALDAV_URL, CALDAV_USERNAME, DATA_DIR, FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS, HIDDEN_CALENDARS, ONLY_CALENDARS, PUBLIC_URL, READ_ONLY, READ_ONLY_CALENDARS- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso claude.ai, icloud.com, claude.com, docker.com, google.internal, apple.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names claude.ai, icloud.com, claude.com, docker.com, google.internal, apple.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects AUTH_RATE_LIMIT, CALDAV_PASSWORD, CONNECTOR_PASSWORD, OAUTH_ALLOW_LOCALHOST, OAUTH_ALLOWED_REDIRECTS, OAUTH_KV, OAUTH_PROVIDER only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
echo '/swapfile none swap sw 0 0' | sudo tee -a /etc/fstab >/dev/nullFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo chmod 600 /swapfileFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo fallocate -l 1G /swapfileFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# The code, and a private .env to fill in.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.sudo swapon /swapfileFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.sudo mkswap /swapfileFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."CONNECTOR_PASSWORD (12+ characters, you type it once when connecting). See .env.example."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if [ ! -f .env ]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// Values shipped in .env.example / docs: never accept one of these.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.chmod 600 .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.def __init__(self, config: RemoteConfig, db: AuthDB, clock: Callable[[], float] = time.time) -> None:Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.# Run: docker compose up -d (reads .env, see .env.example)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.sudo chmod a+r /etc/apt/keyrings/docker.ascFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.service: CalendarService, config: RemoteConfig, *, read_only: bool = FalseFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.DOMAIN: ${DOMAIN:?set DOMAIN in .env}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.chmod 600 .envFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.- run: npx wrangler deploy --dry-run --outdir distFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."from appleid.apple.com). See .env.example."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# Values shipped in .env.example / docs: a server must never start with one of these.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# Needs DOMAIN in .env, pointing at this server's IP.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.sudo chmod 600 /swapfileFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.cp .env.example .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.&& mkdir -p /data && chown app /dataFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.if (!password) return "CONNECTOR_PASSWORD is not set. Run: npx wrangler secret put CONNECTOR_PASSWORD";Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.npx --yes "@anthropic-ai/mcpb@$MCPB_VERSION" validate "$stage/manifest.json"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.RemoteConfig(public_url=BASE, password="change-me-to-a-long-random-string", data_dir=tmp_path)Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.def fake_serve(service: Any, config: remote.RemoteConfig, *, read_only: bool = False) -> None:Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.env_file: .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.npx --yes "@anthropic-ai/mcpb@$MCPB_VERSION" pack "$stage" "dist/apple-calendar-mcp-$version.mcpb"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.out = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.throw new ConfigError("CALDAV_USERNAME and CALDAV_PASSWORD are not set. Use npx wrangler secret put.");Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.subprocess.run(["codesign", "--verify", str(app)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for apple-calendar-eventkit-mcp@0.4.1 as of 20 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim o-uz-ka-an-g-mez: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.