Skills/PyPI/anywidget-mcp

anywidget-mcp@0.2.1

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Expose AnyWidget interfaces through MCP Apps and WebMCP" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher peter-gy · joined 0 days agoInstalls 638Last detonated 2 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-10-27 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Base64 encoding combined with network call; Hidden zero-width characters detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.1sprocessexec .venv/bin/anywidget-mcp
0.1sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/anywidget-mcp': No such file or directory
0.1sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/anywidget_mcp/server.py:114 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Base64 encoding combined with network callsrc/anywidget_mcp/static/index.html:7 · Base64 encoding combined with network call — potential data exfiltrationFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
HIGH
Hidden zero-width characters detectedsrc/anywidget_mcp/static/index.html:69 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal contentFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/anywidget_mcp/static/index.html:117 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

What would make this Verified

7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim peter-gy: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Does not do what the description says≈ +5 on the totalIn the sandbox the skill never performed the task it claims (no call to the service it is for). Make sure the happy path runs without extra setup, or describe the real behavior.
  3. Obfuscated code≈ +5 on the totalRemove base64-assembled strings, eval of decoded text and minified blobs. Reviewers and scanners both treat unreadable code as hostile.
  4. Base64 encoding combined with network call≈ +4 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
  5. Hidden zero-width characters detected≈ +4 on the totalKeep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
  6. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
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