Skills/PyPI/altfinance-mcp

altfinance-mcp@0.4.7

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "MCP server for querying auction results across 20 luxury and collectibles categories via the ALT/FNDATA API" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server) · listed in the official MCP RegistryPublisher alt-fndata-support · joined 10 days agoInstalls 173Last detonated 2 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-05 and scored it 69/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; URL with embedded credentials. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/date
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.2sprocessexec .venv/bin/altfinance-mcp
0.2sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 0)
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialssrc/altfinance_mcp/login_handler.py:216 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:26 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionGROWTH_STRATEGY.md:189 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionGROWTH_STRATEGY.md:491 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionSUBMISSION_CHECKLIST.md:237 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
CRITICAL
Prompting user to enter sensitive credentialssrc/altfinance_mcp/oauth_provider.py:50 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineeringFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
LOW
Prompt injectionSUBMISSION_CHECKLIST.md:230 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageQUICKSTART.md:31 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageSUBMISSION_CHECKLIST.md:237 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageSUBMISSION_CHECKLIST.md:230 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageGROWTH_STRATEGY.md:189 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageGROWTH_STRATEGY.md:491 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialssrc/altfinance_mcp/login_handler.py:31 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:26 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialssrc/altfinance_mcp/server.py:52 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
LOW
Prompt injectionSUBMISSION_CHECKLIST.md:232 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionQUICKSTART.md:31 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageSUBMISSION_CHECKLIST.md:232 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction fileFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈64 tok
1 file · 23 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

11 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim alt-fndata-support: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Does not do what the description says≈ +5 on the totalIn the sandbox the skill never performed the task it claims (no call to the service it is for). Make sure the happy path runs without extra setup, or describe the real behavior.
  4. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim alt-fndata-support