Skills/PyPI/algony-mymcp

algony-mymcp@3.1.2

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Linux system control MCP server over Streamable HTTP with Bearer token auth" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher algony-tony · publishing for 208 daysInstalls 564Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add algony-mymcp -- uvx algony-mymcp
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 22 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
ANTHROPIC_API_KEYOPENAI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: MYMCP_ENV_FILE, OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, OPENAI_API_KEY and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx algony-mymcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 3.1.0

vet-skills diff algony-mymcp 3.1.0 3.1.2

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 3.1.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 88/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'pydantic'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'opentelemetry'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'opentelemetry'
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'opentelemetry'
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.6sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'mymcp'
0.6sprocess8 of 22 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.6sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.6sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmymcp/config.py:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files/etc/mymcp/.env, ./.env. Use get_settings() to retrieve the cached singleton.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmymcp/config.py:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files.env file can be loaded — discovery order: MYMCP_ENV_FILE env var,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmymcp/config.py:21 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfor candidate in ("/etc/mymcp/.env", ".env"):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmymcp/recorder/__main__.py:61 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# /etc/mymcp/.env, then ./.env) so an install using either alternativeFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmymcp/recorder/__main__.py:64 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# /etc/mymcp/.env default rather than emit it verbatim. This calls theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmymcp/recorder/__main__.py:51 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesservice's User= and .env; called with no arguments the behaviour isFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmymcp/recorder/__main__.py:63 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# path (the ./.env case) is meaningless to systemd, so fall back to theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈55 tok
1 file · 27 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for algony-mymcp@3.1.2 as of 35 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.