Skills/PyPI/akko-mcp-trino-atlas

akko-mcp-trino-atlas@0.8.2

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "Apache Atlas context provider for akko-mcp-trino: descriptions, classifications, glossary terms and business metadata of the tables Trino shows the caller." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher akko-p · publishing for 42 daysInstalls 314Last detonated 2 h ago
$claude mcp add akko-mcp-trino-atlas -- uvx akko-mcp-trino-atlas
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
4 of 4 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx akko-mcp-trino-atlas

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.8.0

vet-skills diff akko-mcp-trino-atlas 0.8.0 0.8.2

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.8.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 91/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'httpx'
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'httpx'
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.5sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'akko_mcp_trino'
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.7sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'httpx'
0.7sprocess4 of 4 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.7sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.7sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.7sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

LOW
Dynamic module loadingtests/test_anonymize.py:14 · Dynamic module loading (importlib.loader.exec_module via provenance)_spec.loader.exec_module(anonymize)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_package.py:35 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking({"ATLAS_URL": "http://reader:secret@atlas:21000"}, "credentials"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_provider.py:386 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"ATLAS_PROXY": "http://proxy-user:proxy-pass@proxy:3128",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
LOW
Dynamic module loadingtests/test_anonymize.py:13 · Dynamic module loadinganonymize = importlib.util.module_from_spec(_spec)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈79 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for akko-mcp-trino-atlas@0.8.2 as of 1 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

akko-mcp-trino-atlas@0.8.2 safety verdict: Verified (install only) — KillerSkills