Skills/PyPI/aivy-mcp

aivy-mcp@0.11.5

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for the Aivy Developer API: let your AI assistant read and control your own solar + battery system." Observed in sandbox: calls astral.sh only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher ivyenergy · publishing for 18 daysInstalls 3,302Last detonated 2 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
AIVY_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: AIVY_API_URL, AIVY_HOME, AIVY_MCP_LAUNCH, AIVY_MCP_NO_UPDATE_CHECK
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso ivyenergy.com.au, githubusercontent.com, astral.sh — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · reached only astral.sh
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names ivyenergy.com.au, githubusercontent.com, astral.sh as well as its own vendor. The guard injects AIVY_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx aivy-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL. Summary: calls astral.sh only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1snetworkCONNECT tcp://astral.sh:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.1sprocessexited 1: uvx is still not on PATH; open a new terminal and run: uvx --from aivy-mcp@latest aivy-mcp-setup
0.3sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.3sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.4snetworkCONNECT tcp://astral.sh:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
0.4sprocessexec /usr/bin/curl
0.4sprocessexited 1: uvx is still not on PATH; open a new terminal and run: uvx --from aivy-mcp@latest aivy-mcp-setup

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/aivy_mcp/install.py:142 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([claude, "mcp", "remove", "-s", "user", SERVER_NAME], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patterninstall.sh:3 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/IVYEnergy/aivy-mcp/main/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellinstall.sh:17 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcpb/build.py:97 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["npx", "--yes", "@anthropic-ai/mcpb", "pack", str(HERE), str(target)], check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLsrc/aivy_mcp/update.py:27 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code sourceINSTALLER = "curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/IVYEnergy/aivy-mcp/main/install.sh | sh"Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/aivy_mcp/install.py:148 · Python subprocess execution detecteddone = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=60)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellinstall.sh:3 · Remote installer piped to shell# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/IVYEnergy/aivy-mcp/main/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/aivy_mcp/install.py:132 · Python subprocess execution detectedlisted = subprocess.run([claude, "mcp", "get", SERVER_NAME], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLinstall.sh:3 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code source# curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/IVYEnergy/aivy-mcp/main/install.sh | shFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/aivy_mcp/install.py:119 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesblock += f"\n[mcp_servers.{SERVER_NAME}.env]\nAIVY_API_KEY = {json.dumps(key)}\n"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternsrc/aivy_mcp/update.py:27 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeINSTALLER = "curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/IVYEnergy/aivy-mcp/main/install.sh | sh"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patterninstall.sh:17 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellsrc/aivy_mcp/update.py:27 · Remote installer piped to shellINSTALLER = "curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/IVYEnergy/aivy-mcp/main/install.sh | sh"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
LOW
Dynamic module loadingtests/test_server.py:356 · Dynamic module loadingcheck = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec); spec.loader.exec_module(check)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈4,497 tok
1 file · 41 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for aivy-mcp@0.11.5 as of 1 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ivyenergy: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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