Skills/PyPI/aimarket-mcp

aimarket-mcp@0.6.4

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "alexar76 ecosystem MCP gateway — SSRF-hardened web fetch/search + Metis verify (stdio + HTTP)" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher alexar76 · publishing for 134 daysInstalls 924Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add aimarket-mcp -- uvx aimarket-mcp
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
4 of 4 bundled scripts run with no arguments, with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
AIMARKET_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: AIFACTORY_ENV, AIMARKET_HUB_URL, AIMARKET_MCP_HOST, AIMARKET_MCP_KEY, AIMARKET_MCP_PORT, AIMARKET_MCP_PUBLIC, AIMARKET_MCP_RATE, AIMARKET_MCP_TRUSTED_PROXIES, AIMARKET_MCP_VISITOR_SALT, AIMARKET_METIS_KEY, AIMARKET_METIS_URL, AIMARKET_SANDBOX_VISITOR, AIMARKET_SEARCH_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso modelmarket.dev, duckduckgo.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names modelmarket.dev, duckduckgo.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects AIMARKET_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx aimarket-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.6.3

vet-skills diff aimarket-mcp 0.6.3 0.6.4

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.6.3 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 86/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'httpx'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'starlette'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'mcp'
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.4sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'httpx'
0.4sprocess4 of 4 bundled scripts run with no arguments
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_gateway.py:295 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"http://[::1]/", "http://localhost/", "file:///etc/passwd", "ftp://x/",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/test_ssrf_pinning.py:82 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringassert target == "https://93.184.216.34:8443/x"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/test_outbound_bounds.py:84 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringassert str(seen[0].url) == "https://93.184.216.34:8443/result"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_gateway.py:65 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentialsr = await _rpc(c, "tools/call", {"name": "web_fetch", "arguments": {"url": "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"}})Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
LOW
URL to a private-network addresstests/test_gateway.py:294 · URL to a private-network address — a LAN or development target"http://127.0.0.1/", "http://10.0.0.1/", "http://169.254.169.254/",Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_gateway.py:294 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentials"http://127.0.0.1/", "http://10.0.0.1/", "http://169.254.169.254/",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/test_ssrf_pinning.py:105 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot nameassert target == "http://93.184.216.34:8080/x" and headers == {} and extensions == {}Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/test_outbound_bounds.py:84 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot nameassert str(seen[0].url) == "https://93.184.216.34:8443/result"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/test_ssrf_pinning.py:25 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringassert target == "http://93.184.216.34/path?q=1", targetFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/test_ssrf_pinning.py:25 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot nameassert target == "http://93.184.216.34/path?q=1", targetFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/test_ssrf_pinning.py:105 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringassert target == "http://93.184.216.34:8080/x" and headers == {} and extensions == {}Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using a raw public IP addresstests/test_ssrf_pinning.py:104 · URL using a raw public IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringtarget, headers, extensions = security.pin_target("http://93.184.216.34:8080/x")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_metis_errors.py:21 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingmonkeypatch.setattr(tools, "METIS_URL", "https://user:[email protected]:8443/base?key=query-secret")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/test_ssrf_pinning.py:82 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot nameassert target == "https://93.184.216.34:8443/x"Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
HTTP URL with a raw public IP addresstests/test_ssrf_pinning.py:104 · HTTP URL with a raw public IP address — a hard-coded destination that domain-based monitoring cannot nametarget, headers, extensions = security.pin_target("http://93.184.216.34:8080/x")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_gateway.py:73 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfor url in ("http://localhost:8080/admin", "file:///etc/passwd"):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈60 tok
1 file · 25 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for aimarket-mcp@0.6.4 as of 42 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.