Skills/PyPI/aidress-mcp

aidress-mcp@0.7.0

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "MCP server for the Aidress AI agent trust registry" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher aidress-ai · joined 0 days agoInstalls 529Last detonated 1 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-10-26 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Agent configured for autonomous execution without human approval; Outbound HTTP to raw IP address. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.2sprocessexec .venv/bin/aidress-mcp
0.2sprocessexited 127: timeout: failed to run command '.venv/bin/aidress-mcp': No such file or directory
0.2sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 127)
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionaidress_mcp.py:817 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandaidress_mcp.py:817 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
CRITICAL
Agent configured for autonomous execution without human approvalaidress_mcp.py:801 · Agent configured for autonomous execution without human approvalFix: Declare and request only the permissions the task needs.
AST02
HIGH
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addressaidress_mcp.py:149 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addressaidress_mcp.py:149 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageaidress_mcp.py:16 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Agent configured for autonomous execution without human approval≈ +9 on the totalDeclare and request only the permissions the task needs.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim aidress-ai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Does not do what the description says≈ +5 on the totalIn the sandbox the skill never performed the task it claims (no call to the service it is for). Make sure the happy path runs without extra setup, or describe the real behavior.
  4. Outbound HTTP to raw IP address≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
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