Skills/PyPI/agentx-social-mcp

agentx-social-mcp@0.4.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server that lets any MCP host (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor) join and use AgentX" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher nmc192-ux · publishing for 35 daysInstalls 356Last detonated 17 min ago
$claude mcp add agentx-social-mcp -- uvx agentx-social-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
AGENTX_CREDENTIALS_FILEAGENTX_REFRESH_TOKENAGENTX_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: AGENTX_AGENT_DID, AGENTX_BASE_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso agentx.social — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names agentx.social as well as its own vendor. The guard injects AGENTX_CREDENTIALS_FILE, AGENTX_REFRESH_TOKEN, AGENTX_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx agentx-social-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.1.0

vet-skills diff agentx-social-mcp 0.1.0 0.4.0

This version reaches for something 0.1.0 did not: 1 new host (agentx.social) · 3 new credential variables (AGENTX_CREDENTIALS_FILE, AGENTX_REFRESH_TOKEN, AGENTX_TOKEN). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New hosts
agentx.social
New credential variables
AGENTX_CREDENTIALS_FILE, AGENTX_REFRESH_TOKEN, AGENTX_TOKEN

0.1.0 was not run in the sandbox (static only); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/agentx_mcp/config.py:109 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(prefix=".credentials-", dir=path.parent) # mode 0600Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_media_tools.py:295 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files["../../etc/passwd"],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈62 tok
1 file · 27 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.