Skills/PyPI/agent-tools-mcp

agent-tools-mcp@0.5.1

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "Discover x402 paid services, MCP servers and A2A agents from any MCP-compatible agent (Claude, Cursor, Cline)." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher agenttools-cloud · publishing for 176 daysInstalls 789Last detonated 23 h ago
$claude mcp add agent-tools-mcp -- uvx agent-tools-mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
AGENT_TOOLS_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: AGENT_TOOLS_API_BASE, AGENT_TOOLS_HTTP_LOG_LEVEL, AGENT_TOOLS_LOG_LEVEL
Where it talks to
agent-tools.cloud (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for AGENT_TOOLS_API_KEY and talks to agent-tools.cloud. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets AGENT_TOOLS_API_KEY=agent-tools.cloud -- uvx agent-tools-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.3sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.3sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.3sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.3sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationagent_tools_mcp/server.py:454 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials"to the user or logs. Set AGENT_TOOLS_API_KEY or pass api_key.")}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationagent_tools_mcp/server.py:92 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials"AGENT_TOOLS_API_KEY or pass api_key.",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈664 tok
1 file · 10 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for agent-tools-mcp@0.5.1 as of 22 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.