Skills/PyPI/agent-builder-mcp-aws-transform

agent-builder-mcp-aws-transform@1.1.3

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for building, deploying, and managing agents on AWS Transform" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher aws-transform-team · publishing for 190 daysInstalls 1,934Last detonated 20 min ago
$claude mcp add agent-builder-mcp-aws-transform -- uvx agent-builder-mcp-aws-transform
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso aws.dev — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx agent-builder-mcp-aws-transform

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 1.1.1

vet-skills diff agent-builder-mcp-aws-transform 1.1.1 1.1.3

This version reaches for something 1.1.1 did not: 1 new host (aws.dev). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New hosts
aws.dev

1.1.1 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/agent_builder_mcp/knowledge/data/hitl_sdk_java_docs.json:116 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…tegoryType(ArtifactCategoryType.HITL_FROM_AGENT)\n .fileType(FileType.JSON)\n .build())\n .build())\n .visibility(Visibility.INTERNAL)\n .build();\nString artifactId = client.uploadArtifact(jsonStr.getBytes(), request);" }, { "name": "Json…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/agent_builder_mcp/knowledge/data/sdk_docs.json:5082 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files…NER_ENV set): /home/amazon/.aws/transform-credentials\n - Local development: ~/.aws/transform-credentials", "signature": "get_default_auth_token_file_path() ->…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/agent_builder_mcp/tools/deployment/_build.py:152 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(push_cmd, check=True, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/agent_builder_mcp/tools/deployment/_build.py:143 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(build_cmd, check=True, capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/agent_builder_mcp/tools/deployment/_build.py:106 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(login_cmd, input=password.encode(), check=True, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈64 tok
1 file · 49 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.